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Abstract: In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external 
goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for 
virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a vir-
tuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme 
hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the con-
ditions under which one’s virtue shines through most clearly. I argue that there 
is good sense to be made of Aristotle’s stance on external goods. Drawing on pas-
sages in Politics 7.13 and Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, I develop and defend a distinc-
tion between the “mere” exercise of virtue, and the full or complete exercise of 
virtue. I explain how, on his view, a range of external goods is required for the full 
exercise of virtue, and I show that it is only this full exercise that is constitutive of 
eudaimonia. I argue that, for Aristotle, the distinguishing feature of this distinc-
tion is the value of the virtuous action’s ends. An action that fully expresses virtue 
aims at an end that is unqualifiedly good, while an action that merely exercises 
virtue does not. The external goods Aristotle mentions in NE 1.8 are necessary 
for performing actions with unqualifiedly good ends, and so necessary for the 
complete exercise of virtue.
1 Introduction
In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods 
are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous 
activity.1 This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent 
to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or 
deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under 
1 NE 1.8 (1099a31–b8). I defend this reading of the passage in Section 2.1.
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which one’s virtue shines through most clearly. Why then does Aristotle think 
that a wide range of external goods is required for virtuous activity, and therefore, 
for happiness?
I argue that there is good sense to be made of Aristotle’s stance on exter-
nal goods. Specifically, I explain how, on his view, a range of external goods is 
required for the full exercise of virtue, and I show that it is only this full exercise 
that is constitutive of eudaimonia.2 Drawing on passages in Politics 7.13 and Nico-
machean Ethics 3.1, I develop and defend a distinction between the “mere” exer-
cise of virtue, and the full or complete exercise of virtue. I argue that, for Aristotle, 
the distinguishing feature of this distinction is the value of the virtuous action’s 
ends. An action that fully expresses virtue aims at an end that is unqualifiedly 
good, while an action that merely exercises virtue does not. I argue that the exter-
nal goods Aristotle mentions in NE 1.8 are necessary for performing actions with 
unqualifiedly good ends, and so necessary for the complete exercise of virtue. In 
addition to providing a more satisfactory account than existing proposals of the 
role of external goods in Aristotelian happiness, my interpretation has two addi-
tional upshots. First, it brings to light an under-appreciated and independently 
compelling feature of Aristotle’s ethical thought: the value of virtuous actions 
depends in part on the value of the ends they aim to realize. Second, it finds in 
Aristotle a distinct and powerful way of thinking about the badness of certain 
kinds of misfortune and deprivation: they are bad in part because they prevent us 
from fully realizing our capacity for moral agency, from fully engaging with value 
in the world.
2 The Puzzle
In this section, I set up the problem of external goods, and identify two desiderata 
of a successful account.
2 The general strategy I will develop in what follows has been defended prominently by John 
Cooper. Cooper argues that even when a virtuous agent is able to exercise her virtuous character, 
she is not always able to fully exercise or express it unless certain material conditions are present. 
And, Cooper suggests, it is this full exercise or expression of virtue that is necessary for eudai-
monia. I will argue that the way Cooper develops the distinction between the “mere” exercise of 
virtue and the complete exercise of virtue is ultimately unsuccessful, and I develop and defend 
an alternative.
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2.1 External Goods in NE 1.8
In NE 1.7, Aristotle argues that the highest human good must lie in the charac-
teristic human work or activity, and he identifies this activity with the exercise 
of the rational part of the soul on the basis of virtue, concluding that the highest 
human good, eudaimonia, “is activity of the [rational] soul on the basis of virtue, 
and if there are multiple virtues, on the basis of the best and most complete vir-
tue.”3 In 1.8–1.12, Aristotle tests his account of eudaimonia against the common or 
reputable views, arguing in each case that his account preserves, at least in some 
suitably qualified way, common views about happiness. Amongst the endoxa he 
clearly means to preserve is the idea that an individual cannot be fully happy if 
he suffers great misfortune or deprivation.4
Aristotle’s most explicit discussion of the relationship between external 
goods and eudaimonia comes in NE 1.8 (1099a31–b8), following his substantive 
account of eudaimonia:5
Nevertheless, it is apparent that happiness also needs external goods (τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν 
προσδεομένη), as we said, for (γὰρ) it is impossible or not easy to do fine actions (τὰ καλὰ 
πράττειν) if one is not equipped. For, on the one hand (μὲν γὰρ), many are done by means 
of friends and wealth and political powers as if by tools, and on the other hand (δὲ), men 
who lack some things such as good birth, good children, and beauty soil blessedness; for 
(γὰρ) the man who is very ugly in appearance or of low birth or solitary and childless is 
not entirely happy, and moreover, he would perhaps be even less so if he had thoroughly 
bad children or friends, or if his children or friends, though good, had died. Thus, as we 
said, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition (ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς 
τοιαύτης εὐημερίας), and that is why some people identify happiness with good fortune, 
while others identify it with excellence. NE 1.8 (1099a31–b8)
3 See NE 1.7 1098a16–18. Translations are my own, modified from Irwin 21999.
4 See for example NE 1.8 (1099a31–b8), NE 1.10 (1101a8–13), NE 1.10 (1101a14–a21); see also NE 
7.13 (1153b14–25).
5 By “external goods” I mean to include both goods of the body and goods that are external to 
both the soul and the body. See, for example, Aristotle’s use in NE 1.8, 1099a31–b8. See Cooper 
1985, 176–8, for a helpful discussion of Aristotle’s various uses of the phrase ta ektos agatha. I 
will be assuming for the sake of argument the interpretation of eudaimonia as constituted by 
excellent virtuous activity alone, although my account is compatible with a more “inclusivist” 
reading of eudaimonia; it should be helpful to an inclusivist picture by setting a principled limit 
on what supply of external goods is enough for a happy life to count as complete and self-suffi-
cient. Helpful overviews of this debate can be found in Lear 2009. For some prominent defenses 
of “inclusivism” see Ackrill 1980, Crisp 1994, Hardie 1965, Keyt 1983, Whiting 1986. For defenses 
of “dominant end” or, in the terminology I prefer, “exclusivist” positions, see: Hardie 1979, 
Heina man 1988, 2007, Kraut 1989. For positions that attempt a middle path, see Charles 1999, 
Lear 2004, Scott 1999.
4   Sukaina Hirji
In this passage, Aristotle insists that happiness needs external goods, and imme-
diately offers an explanation introduced in a γάρ clause (1099a32–33): happi-
ness needs external goods because it is impossible or not easy to do fine actions 
without a sufficient supply of goods. He then appears to offer two reasons for the 
latter thesis, in a μέν-δέ clause. First, (μέν at 1099a35) many actions are done 
using goods as instruments; many virtuous actions are difficult or impossible to 
perform without wealth, friends and political power. Second, (δέ at 1099b2) the 
lack of certain goods, such as good birth, good children and beauty, spoils bless-
edness.6 In what immediately follows, Aristotle appears to offer an explanation 
for the content of this δέ clause, introduced by a further γάρ at 1099b3: the man 
who is ugly or of low birth does not seem to be entirely happy, and still less so if 
his children or friends are thoroughly bad, or have died.
On a natural reading, the first γάρ clause at line 1099a32 governs the μέν-δέ 
clause that follows. Otherwise put, on a natural reading, Aristotle is offering two 
reasons for thinking that external goods are important for virtuous activity and 
therefore for happiness. He is not claiming that the lack of good birth, good chil-
dren and beauty directly affect our happiness; rather, he is claiming that their 
lack impedes our ability to perform virtuous actions and therefore, indirectly, 
impedes our happiness.7 What role do goods like good birth, good children and 
beauty play in promoting virtuous activity and therefore happiness? In the next 
section, I consider a strategy defended by John Cooper, and identify some prob-
lems with the way he develops his proposal.
2.2 Two Desiderata
The strategy proposed by John Cooper is prima facie promising for explaining 
why Aristotle would think we need to be well-supplied with a wide range of exter-
nal goods in order to achieve eudaimonia. Cooper argues that even when a vir-
tuous agent is able to exercise her virtuous character, she is not always able to 
fully exercise or express it unless certain material conditions are present. And, 
Cooper suggests, it is this full exercise or expression of virtue that is necessary 
for eudaimonia. Cooper finds support for this reading of Aristotle in the ancient 
commentators who seem to distinguish between the circumstances that allow for 
6 I do not consider in this paper whether blessedness or makarios is distinct from happiness or 
eudaimonia. It might be that blessedness is a particularly exalted form of eudaimonia, and it is 
only this exalted form of happiness that requires external goods. I am here interested in what role 
external goods play in promoting the form of happiness for which they are necessary.
7 See Brown 2006, 230–33, for a helpful discussion of this passage.
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the full exercise of virtue and those that do not.8 Cooper has proposed that certain 
external goods provide the “normal and expected contexts for the exercise of the 
virtues”. These goods, he argues, put the virtuous person “in the position where 
the options for action that are presented to him by circumstances allow him to 
exercise his virtues fully and in ways that one might describe as normal for the 
virtues.”9 So, for example, Cooper argues, someone who lacks physical beauty 
will be impeded in exercising his temperance in a wide range of circumstances.10 
A less attractive individual will have a narrower range of sexual opportunities 
available him, and so also a narrower range of circumstances in which to exercise 
control over his sexual desires. As such, Cooper suggests, the individual will not 
be able to exercise his temperance fully and in the ways normal and expected for 
the virtue of temperance.11
However, it is unclear what constitutes the “normal and expected contexts for 
the exercise of the virtues”. Cooper suggests that the virtuous agent can neither 
be too poorly nor too well equipped with external goods for her to fully express 
her virtue: it is only “in some vaguely marked out middle ground” that the virtu-
ous agent will achieve eudaimonia. But his explanation seems to give very differ-
8 Arius Didymus offers an account of eudaimonia as “the proēgoumenē use of virtue in a com-
plete life.” (Stobaeus II, 51.12 Wachsmuth) Here, as Cooper argues, we should take proēgoumenē 
as meaning something like “coming first” in the estimation and choice of the virtuous agent 
herself. (Aspasius 19. 10  f., trans. Cooper 1985). Alexander of Aphrodisias seems to provide a sim-
ilar reading. In offering an argument against the Stoics on behalf of the Peripatetics, he argues 
“[A]ctivity in accordance with craft covers in each case two things. On the one hand there is 
activity in primary circumstances, as for the flute-player if he is healthy in body and has flutes 
of the kind he wishes for and nothing external troubles him; on the other hand there is activity 
in circumstances he does not wish for, that is, in circumstances the opposite of those just men-
tioned. So, just as the ends of the other crafts lie in activities with wished for things and in pri-
mary circumstances, so also for virtue, supposing it too is a craft.” (Book 2 De Anima 160.31–161.3, 
following the translation of Cooper 1985).
9 Cooper 1985, 182  f. Cooper in fact defends an inclusivist interpretation of eudaimonia in the 
paper, but thinks that external goods are only included in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia 
because they are needed for virtuous activity.
10 On his view, such a person can fully develop the virtue of temperance and exercise it in ways 
that are appropriate to the circumstances, but “the circumstances themselves are restricted by 
his ugliness and the effects this has on others” with the consequence that “his virtue is not called 
upon to regulate his responses and choices in all the sorts of circumstances that the more nor-
mally attractive person would face”; the upshot of this restricted range of circumstances is that 
the agent’s exercise of temperance “is not as full and fine a thing as that more normally attractive 
person’s would be.” Cooper 1985, 183.
11 For discussion of this case see Botros 1987, 113, who memorably dismisses Cooper’s solution 
for explaining the necessity of good looks as being “ludicrously contrived”.
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ent results when we consider different virtues. It is arguable in the case of temper-
ance or magnificence that being very well-supplied with external goods — beauty 
and wealth respectively — will allow for a greater range of opportunities to exer-
cise one’s virtue. But in the case of other virtues, like courage, it seems plausible 
that good fortune could actually limit an agent’s abiltity to exercise her virtue. 
The political prisoner who is captured and tortured has a wide range of oppor-
tunities to exercise her courage; indeed, she seems much better able to exercise 
her courage than she would be under conditions of peace and stability. Cooper’s 
proposal does not seem to give us a principled explanation for why in general a 
virtuous agent can only fully exercise her virtue when she is well-supplied with 
external goods.
A second, further liability for Cooper’s interpretation is that it does not allow 
Aristotle to capture the way in which certain external goods are necessary for 
eudaimonia because they are intrinsically valuable. On Cooper’s reading of Aris-
totle, external goods are required for eudaimonia either because they are instru-
ments for virtuous actions, or because they provide the necessary antecedent 
conditions for the full exercise of virtue. Good children are an example of the 
latter. It is not the fact that Hector is intrinsically valuable to Priam that explains 
why Priam’s happiness is marred by Hector’s death. Rather, on Cooper’s view, 
losing Hector mars Priam’s happiness because “it prevents the subsequent activ-
ities he might have engaged in together with them”.12 This is a surprising result. 
It is intuitive to think that, when Priam loses his beloved child, this is surely bad 
for Priam in part because his child is valuable in and of himself, and not simply 
because the loss of his child impedes his future virtuous actions. On Cooper’s 
interpretation, Aristotle holds an implausibly instrumental explanation for why 
external goods make a difference to our happiness.13
12 Cooper 1985, 189.
13 See also Kraut 1989, 256. Brown 2006 offers an alternative psychological model: virtuous 
agents naturally wish for good things, and when these wishes are frustrated, virtuous agents 
naturally experience pain. This pain undermines our capacity for virtuous activity because vir-
tue demands that we act with pleasure. I worry that Brown’s proposal merely pushes back the 
problem: virtuous agents wish for good things because they are good. If we want to explain why 
their loss is bad, we should appeal to the value of the goods themselves, rather than the emo-
tional responses of the virtuous agent which track their value. Cashen 2012 defends a somewhat 
different psychological solution, according to which severe misfortune and psychological dis-
tress will be detrimental to a virtuous agent’s character itself. Here, I think Cooper is right to 
worry that this kind of psychological mechanism doesn’t explain why an agent who continues 
to be virtuous despite misfortune is still less happy than he otherwise would be, as is suggested 
by the example of Priam.
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Here then are two desiderata for explaining the role Aristotle accords to 
external goods in eudaimonia. First, a successful account should give us a prin-
cipled explanation for why, in general, good fortune and moderate prosperity 
better equip an agent to fully exercise her virtue than misfortune and adversity. 
Second, an account should capture the way in which the intrinsic value of certain 
goods, like good children, is part of the explanation for why they are necessary 
for eudaimonia. The suggestion from Cooper I develop in what follows is the idea 
that, without a sufficient supply of external goods, a virtuous agent cannot fully 
exercise her virtue. I appeal to a neglected passage in Politics 7.13 to motivate and 
develop an alternative account.
3  The “Mere” Exercise of Virtue and the Complete 
Exercise of Virtue
In this section, I look at passages from Politics 7.13 and NE 3.1 to develop and 
defend the distinction between the “mere” exercise of virtue, and the full or com-
plete exercise of virtue. I argue that, for Aristotle, the distinguishing feature of 
this distinction is the value of the virtuous action’s ends.
3.1 Politics 7.13
Consider in full the relevant passage in Politics 7.13:
We say (and we defined in the Ethics, if those discussions are of some help) that happiness 
is the activity and complete exercise of virtue (ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν)14 
and the exercise must not be conditional (ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως), but unqualified (ἀλλ’ 
ἁπλῶς). I mean by conditional what is necessary (λέγω δ’ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τἀναγκαῖα), and 
by unqualified, what is noble (τὸ δ’ ἁπλῶς τὸ καλῶς). For example, in the sphere of just 
actions, just penalties and punishments are indeed from virtue (ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς), but they are 
necessary (ἀναγκαῖαι δέ), and the nobility they have is of necessity (καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως 
ἔχουσιν) (for it would be more choiceworthy if no man nor city needs these sorts of things), 
while the actions that aim at honors and advantage (αἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας) 
are most noble, and unqualifiedly so. For the former destroy something bad (τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
ἕτερον κακοῦ τινος ἀναίρεσίς ἐστιν), but the latter actions do the opposite (αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ 
πράξεις τοὐναντίον). For they are preparatory and productive of good things (κατασκευαὶ 
14 I am taking ἐνέργειαν καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς as a conjunctive phrase meaning the “activity and 
exercise” of virtue.
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γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γεννήσεις). The excellent man would make noble use of poverty and 
disease and other kinds of misfortune,15 but blessedness lies in the opposite (and this defi-
nition is in accordance with the ethical works: the excellent man is of such a sort for whom, 
because of his virtue, good things are unqualifiedly good; it is clear that his use of these 
things must also be unqualifiedly good and noble). This is why it is thought that external 
goods are the cause of happiness, just as if the brilliant and fine performance on the kithara 
is because of the instrument rather than the craft.16
Aristotle, in this passage, distinguishes between two ways of exercising virtue, 
only one of which is constitutive of happiness. And, he seems to affirm that it is 
only when external conditions are favorable in some sense that virtuous activity 
constitutes happiness.17 As Robert Heinaman interprets this passage, Aristotle 
is telling us that an agent’s virtuous activity only counts as eudaimonia when 
certain further conditions are met: the virtuous agent’s activity must be pleasant, 
it must be successful; and it must be something that is intrinsically valuable and 
is also not, at the same time, intrinsically evil.18 And, he suggests, these condi-
tions will be only fulfilled when the “immediate” circumstances of an agent’s 
action are “favorable”. So, for example, punishing someone, though sometimes 
demanded by justice, is always an action that is, in a way, intrinsically evil. As 
such, administering just punishement always falls short of the unconditional 
exercise of virtue. Heinaman connects this discussion in Politics 7.13 with Aris-
totle’s discussion of mixed actions in NE 3.1.19 For Heinaman, punishing is an 
example of a mixed action: it is choiceworthy only relative to the other options 
available to the agent. Heinaman finds further support for his reading in follow-
ing passage from Politics 7.14:
[T]he whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, 
and of actions some are necessary and useful, and some are noble. In these matters the 
same principle of preference that applies to the parts of the soul must apply also to the 
activities of those parts: war must be for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, 
things necessary and useful for the sake of things noble. (Politics 7.14, 1333a30–37)
15 I translate χρῆσις here as “make use of” rather than “exercise” as in 1332a7–8. When Aristotle 
talks about the χρῆσις of a capacity or a state, like virtue, I think the natural way to translate the 
word is “exercise”. However, this translation is awkward when Aristotle talks about the χρῆσις of 
tools or instruments; as such I prefer “make use of”.
16 Politics 7.13 (1332a7–a28); translation is my own, modified from C.D.C Reeve 1998.
17 See also Price 2011, esp. 59–65, for discussion of the relevance of this passage to the role of 
external goods.
18 Though not directly interested in the question of external goods, Robert Heinaman offers an 
interpretation of this passage in the context of arguing that not all virtuous actions contribute to 
an agent’s eudaimonia.
19 Heinaman 1993, 49.
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Here, Aristotle distinguishes between the part of life that involves war and busi-
ness, and the part of life that involves peace and leisure. Further, he distinguishes 
between the kinds of actions that are necessary, and the kinds of actions that are 
noble. As Heinaman understands it, it is the actions that occur during times of 
peace and leisure that are, typically, noble rather than merely necessary.
There is something very natural about Heinaman’s reading of these pas-
sages. As Heinaman understands Aristotle’s discussion, some circumstances are 
choiceworthy and wished for, others are unfavorable and painful. The former 
allow noble actions, while the latter often require actions that are, at least in 
some respect, undesirable or intrinsically evil. Still, Heinaman’s interpretation 
is difficult to square with Aristotle’s ethical theory more broadly. Specifically, 
some virtues do not seem to meet the three criteria he sets out: that the action 
be choiceworthy for its own sake, and be performed in circumstances the man of 
practical wisdom would wish to find himself in. Virtuous actions ranging from 
giving away money to abstaining from pleasures are not obviously intrinsically 
valuable in some way beyond their being exercises of one’s virtuous character; 
moreover, they typically involve some sacrifice on the part of the agent, a sac-
rifice worth making in part because of the good ends the action aims at beyond 
the acting itself.20 If we are to take seriously Aristotle’s distinction in Politics 7.13 
between the complete and conditional exercise of virtue, we should expect that 
some virtuous actions, and especially the virtuous actions that Aristotle treats as 
paradigmatic, do count as the complete exercise of virtue.
This worry comes out most clearly in Heinaman’s discussion of courage. 
One consequence Heinaman draws from his view is that many standard cases of 
courageous actions will count as only conditional exercises of virtue, and so not 
constitutive of eudaimonia. Courage is often demanded in painful and dangerous 
conditions, which is to say, the sorts of conditions no one with practical wisdom 
would wish to find himself in. Moreover, Heinaman argues, the exercise of 
courage often involves a choice amongst intrinsically evil options: either a soldier 
abandons his army and flees the battlefield, or he stands his ground and fights. If 
he flees, he acts out of cowardice. If he stands and fights, he does something cou-
rageous, but he also performs the kinds of actions — killing and harming — that 
are not intrinsically valuable or worth choosing for their own sake.
20 Elsewhere, I address the apparent tension between Aristotle’s claims that virtuous actions 
are themselves ends, and the idea that virtuous actions typically aim at ends beyond themselves. 
I argue that, once we distinguish between virtuous actions and “acting virtuously” — performing 
a virtuous action on the basis of a virtuous character — we see that while acting virtuously is 
itself an end, it depends for its realization on actions that aim at ends beyond themselves. See 
Hirji 2018.
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This consequence of Heinaman’s interpretation — that many of the most 
impressive courageous actions will only be conditionally exercises of virtuous, 
and so not constitutive of eudaimonia — is striking, and difficult to square with 
what Aristotle actually says about courageous actions in wartime. In NE 10.7, in 
arguing for the superiority of the life of contemplation over the life of practical 
action, Aristotle insists that, of virtuous actions, political and military actions are 
in fact preeminently fine and great, notwithstanding that they lack leisure and 
are not choiceworthy for their own sakes. These features of political and military 
actions make them less valuable than contemplation, but Aristotle still seems 
to treat them as amongst the most valuable kinds of virtuous actions. In what 
follows, I defend an alternative interpretation of the Politics 7.13 that avoids the 
problems facing Heinaman’s account.
3.2 The Distinction
Consider again the Politics 7.13 passage. Aristotle begins by claiming that eudaimo-
nia is the activity and complete exercise of virtue at 1332a7–9, and glosses the com-
plete exercise of virtue as what is not conditional but unqualified at 1332a9–10. 
He explains that the conditional is what is necessary and that the unqualified is 
what is noble (1332a10–11).21 At 1332a11–16 he proceeds to illustrate this distinc-
tion by distinguishing between two kinds of actions that are both from virtue (ἀπ’ 
ἀρετῆς): on the one hand, there are actions that are necessary, while on the other 
hand there are actions that aim at honors and advantage (ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς 
εὐπορίας).22 The former actions are noble in a necessary way (τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως 
ἔχουσιν) since (γάρ) it would be more choiceworthy if these actions weren’t needed, 
whereas the latter actions are most noble, and unqualifiedly so. At 1332a16–18 Aris-
totle goes on to explain (γάρ) that while the former actions destroy bad things, the 
latter supply and are productive of good things. Putting this all together, we may 
understand the distinction between the complete and the conditional exercise of 
virtue as follows: the former involves actions that are most noble, or unqualifiedly 
noble, and supply and produce good things, whereas the latter involves actions 
that are necessary, have nobility only “of necessity”, and destroy bad things.
21 See Rogers 1994, esp. 296–298, for discussion of Aristotle’s distinction between the necessary 
and the noble.
22 The term euporia is somewhat surprising here; more common phrases translated as “advan-
tageous” are terms like ophelimon or sumpheron. Perhaps with euporia Aristotle wants to pick out 
goods that serve as resources haplos rather than goods that are advantageous only relative to the 
circumstances, but not absolutely.
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Recall that, as Heinaman reads this passage, the complete exercise of virtue 
is possible only in circumstances that are wished for, and this complete exer-
cise involves performing actions that are intrinsically good and choiceworthy 
for their own sakes. By contrast, actions such as administering punishment fall 
short of the complete exercise of virtue because they are not actions one would 
choose to do for their own sake but instead are actions that are intrinsically evil, 
albeit demanded by non-ideal circumstances. Here, Heinaman seems to me to be 
reading more into the passage than what Aristotle actually says. Aristotle does 
not explicitly draw the distinction between unqualifiedly noble actions and nec-
essary actions on the basis of whether the circumstances of a particular action are 
“wished for”, or on the basis of whether a particular action is intrinsically good 
as opposed to intrinsically evil. Instead, his final explanation of the distinction 
between unqualifiedly noble and necessary actions at 1332a16–18 seems to be on 
the basis of the ends at which the two kinds of actions aim. Aristotle claims that 
the most noble actions — presumably those that allow for the complete exercise 
of virtue — aim at honors and advantage, whereas the actions involved in the 
conditional exercise of virtue are only necessary.23
If all this is right, what the passage seems to tell us is that actions are unquali-
fiedly noble — and so complete or unqualified exercises of virtue — when they aim 
to achieve ends that have positive value, such as honors and advantage. Actions 
23 Admittedly, the language Aristotle uses here — epi combined with the accusative — is not his 
standard teleological language. Still, there is clear precedent for Aristotle using epi combined 
with the accusative to pick out the ends of actions; for example in Metaphysics Delta 17, 1022a8, 
Aristotle explains that one meaning of the term πέρας is the end or τέλος of a thing, and glosses 
the τέλος as “that to which motion and action aim (τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις); here 
Aristotle uses epi combined with the accusative as a gloss for the end or τέλος of an action. See 
Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, 268  f. For another example of this kind of construction in the Poli-
tics referring to the end of an action, see Politics Book 8, 1339b29–30, where Aristotle describes 
people who seek amusement not so much for anything further (οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ) but 
for the pleasure itself (καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν). In what immediately follows (1339b30–31) he goes 
on to describe how it has come about that men make amusements an end (συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος). Here again, I think it is natural to take the epi combined 
with accusative in 1339b29 to refer to the end at which an action aims. Moreover, given that the 
context of Politics 7.13 is one in which Aristotle is talking about virtuous actions — actions that 
must be done voluntarily and with knowledge — it seems plausible he is referring to the ends of 
the virtuous agent’s actions, rather than simply the results, whatever they happen to be. Like-
wise, in the lines that follow (1332a16–18), although Aristotle does not explicitly say that unquali-
fiedly noble actions aim at supplying and producing good things, and that necessary actions aim 
at destroying bad things, it seems natural to read him this way insofar as these lines are meant to 
explain the preceding ones. Finally, as I will suggest in Section 4.3, we find a similiar distinction 
in NE 3.1 that again seems to be drawn on the basis of the ends of actions.
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are only conditionally noble — and so only conditional exercises of virtue — when 
they aim to achieve ends that are only choiceworthy relative to the circumstances, 
such as the destruction of something bad, or the avoidance of some greater evil. 
So, presumably, a just penalty, though an exercise of justice, falls short of being 
unqualifiedly noble because it does not realize an end of positive value. It is 
unclear exactly how Aristotle is thinking about punishment here. But, if we think 
of corrective justice as aiming at equalizing inequalities of goods and evils result-
ing from interactions, it seems plausible that punishing someone destroys some-
thing bad by rectifying an existing inequality.24 Or, perhaps, Aristotle is thinking 
that the immediate consequence of the punishment is that the individual pun-
ished is hurt or pained.25 In either case, it is plausible that punishing someone, 
unlike an unqualifiedly noble action, does not aim at an end with positive value.
We might wonder at this point whether there really is a viable distinction 
between the actions that are preparatory and productive of good things, and the 
actions that remove or destroy something bad. We might think that anything 
good can be equally well thought of as the absence of something bad: safety is the 
removal of a threat, pleasure is the removal of pain, knowledge is the destruction 
of ignorance, and so on. But there is good evidence that Aristotle does counte-
nance a distinction between goods that are unqualifiedly good, and goods that 
are only good relative to the circumstances. For example, in EE 7.2, he distin-
guishes between goods that are good haplos and goods that are only good tini.26 
Examples of the former will be goods like virtue, knowledge and things conducive 
to health; examples of the latter will be things like operations and medicine.27 
It isn’t entirely clear what the basis for the distinction is. Some goods that are 
good haplos seem to be good for anyone in any condition: Aristotle offers as an 
example the enjoyment of health.28 Other goods that are good haplos seem to be 
good for someone only so long as they are in a good condition: Aristotle offers 
as examples honor and wealth, goods that are subject to fortune and which the 
24 For a defense of this interpretation of Aristotelian justice, see Brickhouse 2014.
25 If Aristotle is thinking about punishing in this way, it is interesting to compare his view with 
the discussion of punishment in the Gorgias. In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that punishing 
someone justly is in some way good for the person being punished. Socrates insists that “in 
doing something for the sake of something else” we do not will “those things which we do” but 
rather “that other thing for the sake of which we do them”. Perhaps this is consistent with Aris-
totle’s idea that punishing someone might not achieve an unqualifiedly good end, but it is still 
choiceworthy relative to the alternative. See Gorgias 468b–e.
26 See Gottlieb 1991 for a helpful discussion of this distinction.
27 EE 7.2, 1235b32–35; see also EE 7.2, 1237a4–5, Topics 115b29–35, Topics 3.1, 116b8–10.
28 Topics III.1, 116b8–10.
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unjust person tries to acquire.29 By contrast, what is good tini is only good for 
someone in a particular condition: a diet of thin broth is healthy for someone 
recovering from an illness, but not for human beings as such and in general. Pre-
sumably, the idea here is that it is in the nature of certain kinds of goods that they 
are good always or for the most part for human beings given facts about human 
nature.30 By contrast, goods that are only good tini are not, by their nature, good 
for human beings always or for the most part, but can be beneficial to human 
beings in particular circumstances.31
Setting aside the details, it seems clear Aristotle makes a principled distinc-
tion between goods haplos and goods tini and, it seems plausible that the unqual-
ifiedly noble actions that he describes in Politics 7.13 will be those that aim at ends 
that are good haplos. By contrast, necessary actions will aim at ends that are only 
good tini.32
Consider again Aristotle’s subsequent discussion in Politics 7.14 (1333a30–37). 
Again, Heinaman takes the distinction between the two parts of life and the 
29 EE 8.3, 1248b31–4.
30 As I understand it, the distinction between goods haplos and goods tini is distinct from the 
way in which what is best for someone in a particular circumstance involves hitting the mean 
between excess and deficiency. As Lesley Brown has argued, the mean should be understood 
as what is appropriate to achieving a certain kind of outcome, relative to features of a particular 
situation: the mean is “a normative notion, the notion of something related to human nature, 
needs or purposes, and which is the object of a certain kind of expertise or judgement”. (Brown 
1996, 78). Just as the trainer hits the mean by correctly determining what diet and exercise best 
promotes the health of his trainees, so also the virtuous agent hits the mean by determining what 
feelings and actions are appropriate in some circumstance. In the case of the trainer, what makes 
his prescribed diet and exercise count as appropriate — what makes it the case that they hit the 
mean — is that they are conducive to his trainees’ health. The ends of particular actions  — a 
friend’s happiness, victory, health, and so on — are the analogues to health: they are what make 
the virtuous agent’s actions and feelings appropriate under a particular circumstance. The upshot 
is that, even once we have established that a particular good is good haplos there will be a further 
question of whether, in what way, and to what extent it is good for a particular person in a particu-
lar situation. So for example, knowledge is presumably unqualifiedly good: it is good in virtue of 
its nature, as a first actuality of a human being’s potential for knowing. However, we can imagine 
cases where knowledge might not be good for a particular person at a particular time; certain 
kinds of knowledge in the hands of someone incurably vicious could be dangerous or destructive.
31 So, for example, there is nothing about the nature of losing a limb that makes it good for 
human beings; however the amputation of a limb can benefit human beings in certain conditions.
32 Throughout the paper, I use the language of an action aiming at an end so as to reflect the 
language Aristotle uses in this passage. In fact, there is some reason to think that, for an action 
to be the unqualified exercise of virtue, it must actually accomplish the end of the action, and not 
merely aim at it. But it would be beyond the scope of this paper to defend this in any detail. For 
the purposes of this paper, I hope to remain as neutral as possible on this question.
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distinction between the two kinds of actions to correspond to each other such 
that necessary and useful actions are those that occur in military and business 
contexts, while those that are noble occur in peace and leisure. He takes this as 
further confirmation for the idea that many standard cases of courageous actions 
will be merely necessary and not unqualifiedly noble. But here again Heinaman 
seems to be reading more into the passage than what Aristotle actually says. Aris-
totle does not explicitly say that the actions that are necessary occur in business 
and military contexts, while those that are noble occur in times of peace and 
leisure. Rather, after drawing these distinctions, Aristotle insists that we should 
prefer actions that are noble over those that are necessary and useful, in the same 
way that we should prefer the better part of our soul over the worse, concluding: 
“there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things 
useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable.” (1333a36–7) Aristotle’s 
central point here seems to be that we ought to choose actions in war for the sake 
of achieving peace, to choose actions in business for the sake of leisure, and more 
generally to choose what is necessary and useful for the sake of what is honora-
ble. But notice this is not equivalent to saying that actions in wartime are neces-
sary rather than noble. Again, I have argued that what makes an action necessary 
rather than unqualifiedly noble is the quality of the end at which it aims. And 
here, Aristotle is specifying that the correct end of war is peace. My suggestion 
here is that, if peace is noble, and if courageous actions in wartime aim at peace, 
then these actions should count as unqualified exercises of virtue.33 I am propos-
ing then that so long as actions in business and war aim at the right kinds of ends, 
they are the right kinds of actions to count as unqualifiedly noble for Aristotle.
3.3 NE 3.1 and Mixed Actions
So far, I have supported my interpretation of the distinction between the complete 
and conditional exercise of virtue by appeal to Politics 7.13. Further evidence is 
found in NE 3.1. Here, Aristotle considers a puzzle that arises from his distinction 
33 There are two different kinds of cases of military action that will not meet this condition. 
First, as Aristotle claims in NE 10.7, a military action that is chosen “for the sake of being at war” 
is not courageous, and indeed would be “absolutely murderous”. Second, a military action might 
count as courageous but fall short of the complete exercise of courage if the end the agent aims 
at is not victory or peace, but merely the least bad amongst a range of bad options. In Section 4 
I consider the example of a courageous agent faced with certain defeat in battle; he chooses to 
die fighting rather than surrender and be enslaved. His action is courageous but, I suggest, falls 
short of the full or complete expression of courage.
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between voluntary and involuntary actions. Voluntary actions are those where 
the moving principle is in the agent herself; they are, as such, actions that are 
the appropriate objects of praise and blame.34 By contrast, involuntary actions 
include those that are forced; the moving principle is external to the agent, and 
the agent herself contributes nothing to the action.35 The puzzle arises for actions 
that appear to be coerced or of necessity: these seem voluntary insofar as they are 
chosen by the agent at the time of the action, but involuntary insofar as the agent 
only chooses them because of some sort of external force or threat; the actions are 
not “in themselves” choiceworthy. Aristotle provides two examples. First, a man 
who obeys the command of a tyrant to do something shameful in order to protect 
his family from being killed and, second, a captain who throws his cargo over-
board in a storm to prevent himself and his crew from drowning. These actions 
are “mixed” insofar as they appear both voluntary and involuntary.
Aristotle’s solution to the puzzle is to argue that, although these actions have 
characteristics of both voluntary and involuntary actions, they are ultimately 
more like voluntary actions insofar as the action the agent performs is for the 
sake of an end that the agent deems to be choiceworthy relative to the circum-
stances. As Aristotle says, “they are worthy of choice at the time when they are 
done (αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται), and the end of an action is relative 
to the occasion (τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν).”36 He suggests 
these actions are “in themselves” involuntary (καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι), but 
“now and in return for these gains” (νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια) voluntary, 
concluding that “[w]hat sorts of things are to be chosen in return for what it is not 
easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases.”37
There are two conditions then that seem to have to be met for an action to 
count as mixed: first, the action is choiceworthy under the circumstances and, 
second, the action would not normally be choiceworthy; it is not choiceworthy 
as such or in general. And, crucially, what makes the action choiceworthy in the 
particular circumstance is that the end of the action is conditionally choicewor-
thy: the end of the action is only choiceworthy in order to avoid some greater evil. 
So, for example, the man under the tyrant’s control is forced to choose between 
harm to his family, and performing a shameful action. The ship’s captain is forced 
to choose between destroying valuable cargo and losing his own life and that of 






of wealth — are only worth choosing because the alternative is even worse; there 
is nothing intrinsically valuable about what these actions accomplish.38 Indeed, 
they accomplish ends that are intrinsically disvaluable, but that help avoid some 
further evil, or achieve something valuable down the road.
To be sure, there are important differences between the context of the Politics 
7.13 passage and that of NE 3.1; in the former, Aristotle is interested in what actions 
constitute the complete exercise of virtue, whereas in the latter he is interested in 
the prior question of which actions count as voluntary in the first place.39 Despite 
the difference in context however, as in 7.13 and 7.14, we seem to get a distinction 
between the kinds of actions that aim at ends that are unqualifiedly good, and the 
kinds of actions that aim at ends that are only conditionally good, which is to say 
relative to the other options available.
4  External Goods and the Complete Exercise of 
Virtue
In this section, I argue that unless a virtuous agent is sufficiently supplied with 
the goods of fortune, she is likely to frequently encounter circumstances where 
the best action available to her is only conditionally good.
4.1 Actions and Ends
Return now to the question with which we initially started: why, if eudaimonia is 
constituted by virtuous activity, is a sufficient supply of external goods necessary 
to achieve eudaimonia. So far, I have argued that the complete exercise of virtue 
lies in performing actions that are unqualifiedly noble, which is to say, it lies in 
actions that aim to achieve ends of positive value. Where do external goods fit 
in? We have seen some suggestion already in both Politics 7.13 and NE 3.1. In the 
former, Aristotle directly ties the distinction between the unqualified and condi-
38 There is, admittedly, a difficult question of how Aristotle means to specify the ends of actions. 
Why think that the end of throwing the cargo overboard is the destruction of cargo rather than 
the preservation of life? This is a difficult question for Aristotle’s philosophy of action and not 
one I attempt to answer here. Suffice it to say Aristotle does seem to think there is some privileged 
description of the end of some particular action.
39 Aristotle’s interest in voluntary action is, after all, in the context of better understanding the 
nature of virtuous actions.
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tional exercise of virtue to material conditions; he claims that the excellent man 
will make noble use of poverty, disease and other misfortunes, but that “bless-
edness lies in the opposite”. The suggestion here is that wealth and health are 
needed for the unqualified exercise of virtue and so also for blessedness. Like-
wise, we saw in NE 3.1 how misfortunes ranging from a bad storm to the threats 
of a tyrant can put a virtuous agent in a position where the best options available 
to her are mixed actions.
My proposal, in a nutshell, is that conditions of hardship or deprivation are 
likely to make it the case that the best actions available to a virtuous agent are 
only qualifiedly noble, aiming at ends that are choiceworthy relative to the cir-
cumstances, but not absolutely. Unless a virtuous agent is sufficiently supplied 
with goods of fortune, she is likely to frequently encounter circumstances where 
the best action available to her is simply the least bad amongst a range of bad 
options. Notice how this differs from Heinaman’s suggestion that conditions of 
hardship or difficulty will always result in actions of only conditional value. On 
my interpretation, conditions of hardship or difficulty — such as those encoun-
tered in wartime — may indeed make possible the finest, most noble actions. 
What matters, on my view, is whether the material conditions allow the virtu-
ous agent to aim at an end that is unqualifiedly good. So long as conditions in 
wartime are such that the virtuous agent can stand his ground for the sake of 
peace and security in the polis, his action will count as an unqualifiedly coura-
geous one. But compare this to a case where the virtuous agent, in wartime, is 
faced with certain defeat at the hands of an opposing army. Here, he may choose 
to fight to the death rather than surrender and be enslaved. In doing so, he does 
not stand his ground for the sake of victory; rather, he stands his ground merely 
to avoid a greater evil. His action might count as genuinely courageous but, I 
am suggesting, it falls short of being an unqualifiedly good action, and so an 
instance of the complete exercise of virtue. Or, consider a different kind of case: 
that of a virtuous agent who has been unjustly imprisoned. We can imagine he 
is faced with a choice between beating another inmate on the orders of a sadis-
tic guard, or being beaten himself. Courage may demand that the agent submit 
to a beating rather than harm another inmate. If the virtuous agent chooses to 
endure a beating, he does not accomplish an unqualifiedly good end, but instead 
merely avoids an even greater bad. These are, I submit, the sorts of cases where 
a virtuous agent’s courage is not fully expressed. And this is not simply because 
the antecedent conditions themselves are not ideal, but because the options that 
are available to him as a result of these conditions compel him to perform actions 
that are only good in a qualified way.
The upshot is that, once we understand the complete exercise of virtue in 
terms of certain kinds of ends, it turns out that, unlike on Heinaman’s view, 
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adverse or painful conditions do not necessarily preclude the full exercise of 
virtue. What matters for the complete exercise of virtue is whether the conditions 
in question restrict the ends available to the virtuous agent such that the best 
ends available are only conditionally good. In this respect, my account agrees 
with Heinaman’s: when the options available to an agent are all bad — enslave-
ment, an ignoble death, and so on — even the most virtuous agent will not be able 
to engage in the complete exercise of virtue. By contrast, if the virtuous agent can 
perform an action with an unqualifiedly good end, even under the most adverse 
circumstances, her action counts as an instance of the complete exercise of virtue.
As I suggested in Section 2.1, there is something initially surprising about this 
view. It is natural to think that the virtues of character are essentially remedial: 
they help us deal with the conditions of hardship and deprivation that come with 
our embodied state. It is natural to think that, not only can a virtuous agent exer-
cise her virtue under conditions of extreme hardship, but that these are precisely 
the conditions under which her virtue is most fully expressed. However intuitive 
this view might seem to us, I am suggesting it is not what we find in Aristotle. 
Rather, Aristotle seems to conceive of virtue of character as a capacity directed 
towards valuable goods in the realm of what is achievable in action, and as fully 
expressed in acting so as to realize goods with unqualified value.40
It is illuminating to consider the analogy Aristotle draws with crafts in his dis-
cussion of fortune in NE 1.10. In this chapter, Aristotle is considering the extent to 
which the virtuous man’s happiness is vulnerable to misfortune or chance events. 
He insists that small positive or negative changes in fortune will not affect one’s 
happiness, but that a multitude of great events will make a virtuous man’s life 
more blessed (εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει), explaining that these great 
events are themselves adornments of a life, but also that the virtuous agent’s 
use of these events will be noble and good (ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία 
γίνεται).41 By contrast, the opposite — many bad events — negatively affect an 
agent’s blessedness (θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον) because they bring pain 
and impede an agent’s activities (ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις).42 Aristotle goes 
on to explain that, if activities are what determines the quality of a life, no blessed 
man can become miserable because a virtuous agent would never perform vicious 
actions; he will bear misfortunes well and make the best of bad circumstances (ἐκ 
τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν). Aristotle likens this to the way a good 
40 For example, Aristotle describes phronesis as “a capacity grasping truth involving reason to 
act with respect to human goods (ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ 
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν)”. (NE 6.5, 1140b201)
41 1100b25–28.
42 1100b28–30.
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general will make the best use of the army at his command, and likewise a shoe-
maker will make the best shoes out of the materials given to him.43 Still, Aristotle 
insists, although a virtuous agent will never be miserable, he will also not attain 
blessedness if he experiences misfortunes like that of Priam.
We may appreciate Aristotle’s position by considering the example of shoe-
making. A shoemaker’s art is for the sake of a certain kind of product, a shoe. We 
can imagine a shoemaker who is compelled to practice her art with only the most 
meagre of materials: she fashions shoes out of scraps of poor quality leather. 
Although she is using her skill to make the relevant kind of product, there is, 
I submit, an intuitive sense in which she isn’t fully expressing or realizing her 
ability as a shoemaker; she isn’t making the beautifully crafted and durable shoes 
that her technical skill equips her to make. This is not to suggest that, when she 
produces mediocre shoes using meagre materials, she is not expressing a high 
degree of skill; she surely is. Rather, it is to suggest that the art of shoemaking 
has, internal to it, a certain kind of normative standard: its fullest expression is 
not just in producing shoes, but in produing excellent shoes. The talented shoe-
maker falls short of the normative standard internal to her craft when she pro-
duces a mediocre shoe, even if it is the best shoe she could produce given the 
limited materials available to her.44
Just as the art of shoemaking is directed at shoes, and its fullest expression 
lies in excellent shoes, so also we might think that virtue of character is directed 
at practical action, and its fullest expression is in acting well: performing virtu-
ous actions with knowledge, for their own sake, and from a firm and unchang-
ing character.45 Like the shoemaker who makes the best shoe with the limited 
resources available to her, the virtuous agent who experiences many great mis-
fortunes can perform the best actions available to her, actions that are genuine 
expressions of her virtue, but she does not fully realize or express her virtuous 
character in these actions. Plausibly, this is reflected in the quality of her acting. 
When the virtuous agent chooses to renounce her political commitments on the 
orders of a tyrant in order to save her family, she surely recognizes that this action 
43 This echoes the analogy with crafts Alexander draws, quoted in Section 2.2, note 6.
44 Of course, the analogy here is not perfect. In the case of shoes, we can distinguish between 
better and worse shoes; the best exercise of the craft of shoemaking will be in the production of 
excellent shoes. In the case of virtue, I have suggested we can make a further distinction between 
actions that are unqualifiedly good and those that are only conditionally good. Because of the 
way in which virtue of character is a capacity directed towards human goods, the fullest expres-
sion of virtue, I am arguing, will be in actions that aim to realize unqualifiedly good ends, not 
merely better ends than the alternative available actions.
45 NE 2.4, 1105a30–34.
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is not unqualifiedly choiceworthy. Although she knows it is the best action avail-
able to her, we can suppose the quality of her boulēsis and prohairesis are differ-
ent from what they would be if the action were unqualifiedly choiceworthy. Her 
choice and desire are, perhaps, not as wholehearted as they otherwise would be. 
Likewise, although she presumably takes pleasure in the action knowing that it 
will achieve something good down the line, we can imagine her pleasure is not as 
great as it otherwise would be or, indeed, is mixed with some pain.
4.2 Beauty, Good Birth, and Good Children
So far, I have argued that unless a virtuous agent is sufficiently supplied with 
goods of fortune, she is likely to frequently encounter circumstances where the 
best action available to her is only conditionally good. Conditions of hardship 
or deprivation often prevent a virtuous agent from fully expressing her virtue, 
performing actions with unqualifiedly good ends. Do all the external goods that 
Aristotle mentions fit with my analysis? How does my view explain the necessity 
of the goods Aristotle mentions in NE 1.8: beauty, good birth and good children?
Consider the role of beauty first. As we saw, Cooper’s general strategy is to 
argue that goods like beauty are necessary to provide the normal and expected 
contexts for the exercise of various virtues. I argued that Cooper’s strategy was 
not fully satisfying. Still, Cooper’s idea that beauty makes sexual partners avail-
able might be connected to the way in which beauty makes possible intrinsically 
desirable ends. Specifically, beauty might be necessary to secure the romantic 
partner of one’s choice.46 It is a familiar and sometimes dismaying feature of 
romantic attraction that it typically requires, in addition to an appreciation of 
a person’s character and intellect, some physical attraction. Indeed, Aristotle 
seems sensitive to the ways in which incidental features of a person might prevent 
the formation of a complete friendship between two virtuous agents; in the EE, he 
considers the possibility that an individual who smells terrible might be unable 
46 I use the example of a romantic partner because this is the clearest case of a friendship that 
requires some physical attraction but it seems to me plausible that Aristotle thinks good looks 
are needed even for platonic friendships for the reasons I describe below. I also do not mean this 
suggestion to be exhaustive of the role of beauty in a happy life. Presumably, there are multiple 
ways in which beauty might contribute to virtuous activity and therefore happiness. For exam-
ple, we can imagine that, in the context of Greek politics, someone who isn’t reasonably attrac-
tive would not be viewed as a leader or moral exemplar and so would be cut off from a range of 
unqualifiedly good actions in the political context. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
this suggestion.
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to maintain virtuous friendships.47 My suggestion is that beauty, though not the 
basis for complete friendships — including close romantic relationships — might 
be a necessary condition for such friendships; the pain caused by one’s ugliness 
might outweigh the pleasure caused by one’s goodness.48 And, I want to suggest, 
complete friendships make possible frequent opportunities for the complete 
exercise of virtue. When a virtuous individual treats her spouse with generosity 
and respect, she does so in accordance with her spouse’s desert, and for the sake 
of an unqualifiedly good end, namely, the eudaimonia of her spouse; as such, 
her actions towards her spouse are complete exercises of her virtue. By con-
trast, my suggestion is, an ugly person might be unable to form complete friend-
ships. Instead, she might be left to settle for lesser friendships based on utility 
or pleasure, and these friendships will not provide plentiful opportunities for 
the complete exercise of virtue. These friendships might be better than the alter-
native — being friendless — but as Aristotle describes them, may often involve 
requesting or rendering services that are morally degrading; as such, these lesser 
friendships — and the actions they involve — might count as conditionally but not 
unqualifiedly good.49
Turn now to good birth (εὐγένεια). In the Rhetoric, Aristotle explains good 
birth as consisting in being a member of a state or race that is “indigenous or 
ancient” and of which the earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that con-
tinues to produce distinguished men with many admired qualities. Good birth 
implies that “the founders of the line have been notable for excellence or wealth 
or something else which is highly prized, and that many distinguished persons 
belong to the family (ἐκ τοῦ γένους)”.50 One need only reflect on how, even in the 
present day, being born from certain backgrounds can effect one’s opportunities 
or choices to see how lacking a good birth might prevent one from engaging in the 
best kinds of virtuous actions. The race or class of an individual’s family can have 
an enormous affect on one’s access to opportunities and material resources, the 
respect and trust of others, and indeed one’s own self-esteem.51 We can imagine 
47 EE 1237b5–7.
48 It is worth noticing that although Aristotle mentions beauty in the NE 1.8 passage (ἐνίων 
δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους), he goes on in what 
immediately follows to explain that a man who is extremely ugly (ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης) would 
not be altogether happy. It may be then that what he has in mind by beauty in this passage is 
something more like being decent looking. (NE 1.8, 1099b4–5)
49 See NE 1159b. We can imagine, for example, an individual who lavishes praise on someone 
undeserving of honor or respect in order to maintain a friendship of utility.
50 Rhetoric 1.5, 1360b32–b38.
51 It is not clear whether Aristotle thinks that good birth is intrinsically valuable. If he does, this 
will be a point where we are likely to disagree.
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someone born in a poor black neighborhood who has, against the odds, managed 
to fully develop his virtuous character. However, in trying to provide for his 
family, he is faced with only bad options: work a demeaning job for less than a 
living wage, or break the law and risk his own life selling drugs. Whatever the vir-
tuous agent chooses to do in this situation, his action is surely not unqualifiedly 
choiceworthy. Rather, it is an action that is made necessary by the limited possi-
bilities or resources available to him. By contrast, someone who is born well, who 
is respected and trusted by others, will have the opportunity to work in noble pro-
fessions where he can hope to accomplish ends that are unqualifiedly good. For 
example, someone who is well-born has a significantly better chance of serving in 
politics, where he can work to make life better for his political community; here, 
he is fully exercising his virtue by aiming at ends that are unqualifiedly good.
We can imagine a somewhat different story for the importance of having good 
children. Good children, as they become adults, can provide us with some of the 
most intimate and long-lasting friendships. And, as I suggested earlier, virtuous 
friendships provide opportunities for the complete exercise of virtue: the best 
kinds of friendships are, for Aristotle, ones where we wish and act well towards 
our friends for their own sake, because of their good characters. The end we seek 
to accomplish in a complete friendship is an unqualified good, namely, the eudai-
monia of our friend. By contrast, a parent with a “bad” child, one who is vicious 
and resistant to moral education, may only have bad options to choose from: 
punish the child in order to improve his character or allow the child to continue to 
develop his vicious nature. Although punishment might be the best option avail-
able to the parent, and may count as the just action under the circumstances, it 
is, as we have seen, an example of an action that is not noble or choiceworthy 
in an unqualified way. Rather, I have suggested, punishing someone “destroys 
something bad” by rectifying an injustice or improving the bad character of the 
wrong-doer, but it does not accomplish an end that is unqualifiedly good.52
One worry I raised for Cooper’s interpretation is that it cannot capture the 
way in which certain external goods are necessary for eudaimonia because they 
are intrinsically valuable. But, on the view I am defending, there is a way in which 
Cooper’s explanation — that good children provide opportunities for the full exer-
cise of virtue — is consisent with the idea that good children are intrinsically valu-
able. I have argued that the value of virtuous actions depends in part on the value 
52 The case of punishment or κόλασις is perhaps different from that of revenge or τιμωρία. Aris-
totle describes the former as being in the interests of the wrong-doer, while the latter is in the 
interests of the person who inflicts the suffering. Revenge provides the wronged party with sat-
isfaction, and perhaps Aristotle thinks that this is an unqualifiedly good end in the right circum-
stances. See Rhetoric 1369b12–14 for this distinction.
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of their ends; virtue of character is a capacity that equips an agent to respond 
appropriately to value in the world. The relationship Priam has with his child 
Hector is, we can imagine, an intimate friendship between two virtuous agents. 
The actions that Priam performs towards Hector are virtuous actions, and they 
are virtuous in part because Hector is good, and deserving of being a beneficiary 
of his virtuous actions. When Priam loses his son, he loses something of great 
value and as such, also loses the opportunity to engage in virtuous ways with this 
object of value. This is not to reduce the value of the child to the value of the vir-
tuous activity that Priam engages in. Rather, it is to recognize the ways in which 
the best kinds of virtuous actions depend on the presence of valuable goods with 
which the virtuous agent can engage.
More generally, we have a principled explanation for how deprivation or mis-
fortune can effect even the most virtuous agent’s happiness. I have suggested 
different mechanisms in the case of the above goods. Sometimes, the good in 
question, such as beauty or good birth, provides the antecedent conditions under 
which an agent can perform unqualifiedly noble actions. At other times, such as 
with good children, the good is itself, in a way, the end of unqualifiedly virtuous 
action: as I suggested above, a parent acts for the sake of the well-being of her 
child when her child is good. What unites these explanations is the idea that, 
under certain conditions, a virtuous agent is prevented from performing the best 
kinds of actions and, as such, is prevented from fully realizing or expressing her 
virtuous character, and so also from fully achieving eudaimonia.
Notice how the role of goods like beauty, good birth and good children differs 
from the role of goods like wealth and political power. On my view, the latter 
serve as resources or instruments in accomplishing some given end, whereas the 
former effect what sorts of ends are available to an agent in the first place. Con-
sider an agent who wants to help her virtuous friend cover medical expenses. The 
end she aims to accomplish is unqualifiedly good: to promote the well-being of 
her deserving friend. The extent to which she is able to accomplish this end will 
depend on the money she has available; money here serves as an instrument in 
her virtuous action. By contrast, consider again an individual who lacks virtu-
ous friendships. Even if she has plenty of money available, she does not have 
the opportunity to spend this money accomplishing unqualifiedly good actions 
towards her friends; the actions available to her in the context of her lesser friend-
ships will be, at best, only conditionally good.53 The upshot is that we get an 
53 This is not to say that Aristotle’s categorization of these goods is hard and fast. After all, we 
can imagine cases where wealth, for example, plays the latter role: someone in poverty, just like 
someone born from the wrong family, might be forced to choose between degrading or unlawful 
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explanation for the badness of certain kinds of deprivation and misfortune that 
goes well beyond just the mere lack of resources to accomplish one’s ends.
In this paper, I have defended, in outline, an explanation for the role of exter-
nal goods in Aristotle in a way that avoids the central challenges of other nearby 
interpretations, and does justice to Aristotle’s various discussions. In doing so, 
I have also hoped to identify and motivate an independently interesting feature 
of Aristotle’s ethical thought: that the goodness of virtuous actions depends in 
part on the value of the objects they engage with. More generally, I have hoped 
to suggest that the importance Aristotle places on certain goods like beauty, 
good birth and good children is not, as is often thought, hopelessly aristocratic. 
Indeed, if what I have argued is right, Aristotle is not only deeply sensitive to the 
ways in which our well-being depends on our material conditions and opportu-
nities, he also offers us a distinct and compelling explanation for why we need a 
moderate supply of external goods in order to be happy: without certain goods, 
we are unable to fully express our capacity for practical agency, to fully engage 
with value in the world.
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